Abstract
In early 1935 Britain, France and Italy signed a series of agreements that seemed to indicate genuine international co-operation in the tradition of collective security. By the beginning of 1938, the Anglo-French-Italian harmony of 1935 had entirely unravelled, exposing differences that precluded any sort of enduring reconciliation. Although they had not turned against each other, Britain and France now addressed the Mediterranean situation — and especially Italy — in contrasting ways. The growing divergence of British and French interpretations of Italian policy during this period reflected a fundamental shift in their understanding of Italy’s role in European affairs. In early 1935, the British and French saw Italy as a nation committed to collective European security but, by 1938, they recognized that the Fascist regime attached significant importance to its relationship with Nazi Germany.
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Notes
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P. Gretton, ‘The Nyon Conference — the Naval Aspect’, English Historical Review, xc (1975), pp. 103–12;
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Darlan note, 12 November 1937, SHM, 1BB2, 208/12; Campinchi to Daladier, 24 November 1937, SHAT, 2N24. See also R. M. Salerno, ‘The French Navy and the Appeasement of Italy, 1937–9’, English Historical Review, cxii (1997), pp. 73–80.
Procès-verbal du séance de la CPDN, 15 March 1938, SHAT, 2N25; Phipps to Halifax, 26 March 1938, Phipps Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, PHPP 1/20; Fraser to Phipps, 16 March 1938, PRO, FO 371/22338/R 3035/162/12; C. A. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933–39 (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1943), pp. 156–8.
Perth to Halifax, 13 March 1938, PRO, FO 371/22315/R 2493/137/3; D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (New York: Putnam, 1972), pp. 60–6; Cabinet Foreign Policy Committee, 27th meeting, 21 March 1938, PRO, CAB 27/623; Cabinet minutes, 22 March 1938, PRO, CAB 23/93/15(38).
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Salerno, R.M. (2002). Britain, France and the Emerging Italian Threat, 1935–38. In: Alexander, M.S., Philpott, W.J. (eds) Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230554481_4
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