Human Values pp 102-126 | Cite as

The Polymorphy of Practical Reason



Natural law theory (NLT) offers an approach to normative ethics that is simple, distinctive, and persuasive. It posits a variety of different sorts of basic goods, things which are good in themselves rather than merely instrumentally good. These goods are the basis both of motivation and of justification: most if not all of our practical reasons arise from them, and to justify an action is to explain something about its relation to the goods. Our practical reasons are, irreducibly, polymorphous; and the source of that polymorphy is the variety of the goods.


Practical Reason Practical Rationality Important Good Moral Assessment Lethal Injection 
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© Timothy Chappell 2004

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