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Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance

Chapter
Part of the The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Series book series (JLEI)

Abstract

Over the past two decades the ideology of shareholder value has become entrenched as a principle of corporate governance among companies based in the United States and Britain. Over the past two or three years, the rhetoric of shareholder value has become prominent in the corporate governance debates in European nations such as Germany, France and Sweden. Within the past year, the arguments for ‘maximizing shareholder value’ have even achieved prominence in Japan. In 1999 the OECD issued a document, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, that emphasizes that corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interests of shareholders (OECD, 1999)

Keywords

Stock Market Corporate Governance Mutual Fund Institutional Investor Pension Fund 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2002

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