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Behavioural Game Theory: Thinking, Learning and Teaching

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Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour

Abstract

Game theory is a mathematical system for analysing and predicting how humans behave in strategic situations. Standard equilibrium analyses assume that all players: (1) form beliefs based on an analysis of what others might do (strategic thinking); (2) choose the best response given those beliefs (optimization); and (3) adjust best responses and beliefs until they are mutually consistent (equilibrium).

This research was supported by NSF grants SBR 9730364, SBR 9730187 and SES-0078911. Thanks to many people for helpful comments on this research, particularly Caltech colleagues (especially Richard McKelvey, Tom Palfrey and Charles Plott), Monica Capra, Vince Crawford, John Duffy, Drew Fudenberg, John Kagel, members of the MacArthur Preferences Network, our research assistants and collaborators Dan Clendenning, Graham Free, David Hsia, Ming Hsu, Hongjai Rhee and Xin Wang, and seminar audience members and referees (especially two for this book) too numerous to mention. Dan Levin gave the shooting-ahead military example of sophistication. Dave Cooper, Ido F.rev and Guillaume Frechette wrote helpful emails.

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Authors
  1. Colin F. Camerer
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  2. Teck-Hua Ho
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  3. Juin Kuan Chong
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Professor of Economics, University College London, UK

    Steffen Huck

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© 2004 Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Juin Kuan Chong

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Camerer, C.F., Ho, TH., Chong, J.K. (2004). Behavioural Game Theory: Thinking, Learning and Teaching. In: Huck, S. (eds) Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523371_8

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