Abstract
An important development in economics is the emergence of experimental economics, and Werner Güth has been one of its pioneers. Moving from armchair theorizing to controlled laboratory experiments may be as important a step in the development of economic theory as it once was for the natural sciences to move from Aristotelian scholastic speculation to modern empirical science.1
This chapter is a major revision of SSE WP 382 of May 2000.1 am grateful for helpful comments from Ana Ania, Geir Asheim, Kaushik Basu, Larry Blume, Vincent Crawford, Martin Dufwenberg, David Easley, Tore F.llingsen, Ernst Fehr, Jean-Michel Grandmont, Thorsten Hens, Jens Josephson, Donzhe Li, Sendhil Mullainathan, Rosemarie Nagel, A1 Roth, Maria Saez-Marti, Larry Samuelson, Martin Shubik, Jon-Thor Sturlason, Sylvain Sorin, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Shmuel Zamir, and to seminar participants at presentation of various drafts of the chapter.
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© 2004 Jörgen W. Weibull
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Weibull, J.W. (2004). Testing Game Theory. In: Huck, S. (eds) Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230523371_6
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