An important development in economics is the emergence of experimental economics, and Werner Güth has been one of its pioneers. Moving from armchair theorizing to controlled laboratory experiments may be as important a step in the development of economic theory as it once was for the natural sciences to move from Aristotelian scholastic speculation to modern empirical science.1


Game Form Dictator Game Sequential Equilibrium Monetary Payoff Material Payoff 
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© Jörgen W. Weibull 2004

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  • Jörgen W. Weibull

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