Abstract
When given the opportunity, politicians try to manipulate democratic institutions to their own advantage (Riker, 1986). In mature democracies, institutional constraints that prevent manipulation have evolved over time. In contrast, the political systems of young democracies are less restricted in this area and encourage electoral heresthetics. The most vulnerable parameters of parliamentary elections are district magnitudes and boundaries, the formulas for seat allocation, the ballot structure, the thresholds of exclusion and the timing of elections.
1. Acknowledgements are due to Josep Colomer, Matt Golder and an anonymous referee who provided helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
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Further reading
Benoit, Kenneth and Jacqueline Hayden (2001) Institutional Change and Persistence: the Origins and Evolution of Poland’s Electoral System 1989–2001. Paper presented at First General Conference, European Consortium for Political Research, University of Kent, Canterbury, 6–8 September.
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Kaminski, Marek M. (2001) ‘Coalitional Stability of Multi-Party Systems: Evidence from Poland,’ American Journal of Political Science, 45, 2: 294–312.
Kaminski, Marek M. (2002). ‘Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989–1993,’ Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14, 3: 325–59.
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Kaminski, M.M., Nalepa, M.A. (2004). Poland: Learning to Manipulate Electoral Rules. In: Colomer, J.M. (eds) The Handbook of Electoral System Choice. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522749_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522749_21
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