Abstract
Of the many challenges facing Africans, the establishment of durable peace is probably the most critical, yet the most difficult to achieve. According to some estimates, one-fifth of the people on the continent live in countries involved in conflict. It is now well established that conflicts in Africa have been a major hindrance to the improvement of the wellbeing of Africans (World Bank, 2000). In addition to costs such as loss of life, injuries and the general disruption of economic and social activities (Stewart, 2000; and Elbadawi and Ndungu, 2001), investment flows are damaged as a result of the increased risk premium. They have an impact on human development by disrupting investment in human capital and the provision of basic services, and increasing mortality rates.
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Kimenyi, M.S. (2005). Ethnicity, Institutions of Governance and Conflict Avoidance. In: Fosu, A.K., Collier, P. (eds) Post-Conflict Economies in Africa. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522732_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522732_4
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