Abstract
Unless we understand, and act upon, the causes of the present HIPC problem, its recurrence is almost certain.1 Poor countries, and poor people, will be condemned to live through repeated cycles of borrowing, default and recession. But this is easier said than done. The voluminous literature on debt relief emphasizes everything from bad policy to terms of trade shocks to political instability to globalization. Depending on one’s personal preferences (and biases) you can ‘pick and mix’ virtually any combination of explanatory factors.
We are grateful to the participants in the 17–18 August 2001 Helsinki meeting for their comments, especially to Ernest Aryeetey, Jean-Claude Berthélemy, Léonce Ndikumana, Gordon Menzies and Charles Okeahalam. We thank Bill Easterly for discussions and assistance. All errors remain our own.
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© 2004 The United Nations University
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Addison, T., Rahman, A. (2004). Resolving the HIPC Problem: Is Good Policy Enough?. In: Addison, T., Hansen, H., Tarp, F. (eds) Debt Relief for Poor Countries. Studies in Development Economics and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522329_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230522329_5
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