Abstract
The present chapter re-examines the Bond and Chen (1987) model on illegal immigration, introducing a government budget constraint (GBC) on the host country’s government. It examines the effects of financing internal enforcement of illegal immigration by the host-country’s government on the welfare of the host (labor-importing) country, the foreign (labor-exporting) country and the world, both in the absence and in the presence of international capital mobility. The aim of this chapter is to determine whether internal enforcement may be a Pareto-improving policy.
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© 2005 Chisato Yoshida and Alan D.Woodland
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Yoshida, C., Woodland, A.D. (2005). The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration. In: The Economics of Illegal Immigration. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230514881_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230514881_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-51498-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-51488-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)