Abstract
This chapter argues that King Hussein’s decision to link Jordan’s national security policy to Egyptian interests was largely responsible for the loss of the West Bank in June 1967. Hussein’s signing of a defence pact with Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser, while understandable given the highly charged atmosphere of the time, was based on emotional rather than rational factors. The king’s decision was taken with wide popular support, but without the backing of his experienced military professionals in the national security establishment.
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© 2002 Lawrence Tal
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Tal, L. (2002). Jordan’s March to War. In: Politics, the Military and National Security in Jordan, 1955–1967. St Antony's Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230513921_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230513921_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-42780-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-51392-1
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