Abstract
In the previous chapter, I discussed some influences on modern retreats from TE, suggesting how we might see Goodman’s method for the justification of epistemic norms, MRE, as meshing with the different forms of NE identifiable in the wake of Quine’s arguments for naturalism. In this chapter, I will be considering the variety I dubbed anti-psychologism, or AP. AP holds that epistemology has some kind of subject-matter, and that MRE is thus capable of yielding a definitive theory of epistemic norms that might function as a kind of foundation for science (in a weak sense), but that these norms do not merely detail the structure of a cognitive reasoning competence.
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© 2003 Jonathan Knowles
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Knowles, J. (2003). Anti-psychologism. In: Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511262_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-50836-5
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-51126-2
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