Abstract
In this concluding chapter, the principal focus is on the parties’ differing approach to two main issues and one subsidiary question. These adverted to their perspective on the use of military force and reliance on nuclear weapons, a central instrument of the NATO alliance and their view of the priorities in managing the conflict in Northern Ireland. In the cases studies examined in Parts II and IV, the parties were in broad agreement in their initial response and in their declared objectives. At Suez they agreed that President Nasser’s relatively sudden and unheralded take-over of the Canal manifest his determination to damage Britain’s prestige and influence in the Middle East and should be resisted and, as far as possible, reversed. In 1982 the parties were at one in their feelings of humiliation and demanded the prompt withdrawal of Argentinian forces from the Falklands. Likewise in 1990 they were shocked by Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and unanimous in seeking the pull-back of Iraqi forces. In Northern Ireland the parties sought a political accommodation which would end violence and diminish hostility between the two communities.
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© 2000 Dan Keohane
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Keohane, D. (2000). Conclusion. In: Security in British Politics, 1945–99. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511217_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511217_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-41103-0
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