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From Political Community to Uncommon Security

  • Simon Duke
Part of the St Antony’s Series book series

Abstract

The EPC made two highly significant contributions to the IGC process. First, involvement in EPC gave rise to a sense of common values and identity, which in turn underpinned the IGC discussions. Second, the history of EPC illustrated that the CFSP discussions need not be about extremes — federalism or complete national autonomy — but about combining sovereignty with voluntary constraint. Just as it was highly unlikely that Community members would choose to renationalise foreign policy, thus undermining the fruits of EPC collaboration, it was also unrealistic to expect the same competencies of the Community in the economic and monetary realm to be extended to foreign and security policy. The IGC was therefore a search for a balance between national and community interests and, some might argue, the lowest common denominator.

Keywords

Joint Action Security Council Security Policy Political Community European Council 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

  1. For an account of the EC/WEU action in the Gulf War see, Pia Christa Wood, ‘European Political Cooperation: Lessons from the Gulf War and Yugoslavia’, in Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal, The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, Vol. 2 (Harlow, Essex: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 227–44.Google Scholar
  2. Bregor Schöllgen, ‘Putting Germany’s Post-Unification Foreign Policy to the Test’, NATO Review, Vol. 41 (2) April 1993, p. 17.Google Scholar
  3. Trevor C. Salmon, ‘Testing times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–92’, International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1992), p. 244.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Quoted in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds), The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1992), p. 315.Google Scholar
  5. Steven Philip Kramer, Does France Still Count? The French Role in the New Europe (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), p. 35.Google Scholar
  6. The latter was essential for Germany to play a role in out-of-area activities. The constitutional issue was a delicate one since it had to be addressed in order for Germany to play a significant role in Europe’s evolving security environment. The alternative, as Roger Palin has noted, ‘was a renationalisation of Germany’s force structure as part of a more independently minded nation – a Germany within Europe, as opposed to a European Germany’. See Roger H. Palin, ‘Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects’, Adelphi Paper 294 (London: IISS/Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 10.Google Scholar
  7. Panos Tsakaloyannis, The European Union as a Security Community: Problems and Prospects (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996), p. 130.Google Scholar
  8. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 796.Google Scholar
  9. On Franco-German defence integration see, Simon Duke, The New European Security Disorder (London: Macmillan/St Antony’s, 1996), pp. 215–54.Google Scholar
  10. Willem van Eekelen, Debating European Security, 1948–98 (The Hague: Sdu Publishers, 1998). For full text of the Bartholomew Memorandum see Annex II, pp. 340–44.Google Scholar
  11. Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 182.Google Scholar
  12. Mazzuchelli, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to create the European Union (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1997), p. 191.Google Scholar
  13. For an authoritative account of the various national positions in the lead up to, during, and after the negotiations, see Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates, and Future Implications (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994).Google Scholar
  14. Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 3b. Some have disputed the extent to which the principle of subsidiarity can be applied to the second pillar. For instance, Nanette Neuwahl argues that Title V of the TEU, unlike Title VI on Co-operation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, does not contain explicit reference to the principle. In another example David O’Keefe and Patrick Twomey argue that, ‘The principle of subsidiarity is intended to govern the relations between the Community and its Member States. Therefore, it cannot, prima facie, be used in relations between the pillars’. In David O’Keefe and Patrick M. Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chichester: Chancery Law Publishing, 1994), p. 236–7.Google Scholar
  15. Fraser Cameron, ‘Where the European Commission Comes In: From the Single European Act to Maastricht’, in Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, Wolfgang Wessels (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 100.Google Scholar
  16. In the case of South Africa the Nine found a course of action very difficult to agree upon in spite of the underlying condemnation of apartheid. The outcome was the adoption of a Code of Conduct applying to EC companies conducting business with South Africa. But the Code was voluntary and there were no mechanisms for penalties in case of violation. For a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the sanctions against South Africa, see Martin Holland, European Union Common Foreign Policy: From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa (New York: Macmillan/St Martin’s Press, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Daniela Obradovic, ‘Policy Legitimacy and the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34(2), June 1996, pp. 191–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Simon Duke 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon Duke
    • 1
  1. 1.European Institute of Public AdministrationMaastrichtNetherlands

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