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Actual Non-legislative Powers of the Russian President and Parliament: Cabinet Formation and Dismissal

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Parliamentary Power in Russia, 1994–2001

Part of the book series: St Antony’s Series ((STANTS))

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Abstract

Following from the analysis in previous chapters of the Russian President and Parliament’s legislative powers, this chapter focuses on their use of non-legislative powers in terms of cabinet formation and dismissal. Determining the composition of the Government is the only non-legislative function, of those considered in Figure 2.1, exercised by the Russian President and Parliament from 1994 to 1999. Although threats were made to dissolve the Duma and impeach the President, they were not fulfilled so this non-legislative power is not considered.

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  1. Federal Constitutional Law, no. 2, ‘On the Government of the Russian Federation’, Sbornik Federal’nykh Konstitutsionnykh Zakonov i Federal’nykh Zakonov (Moscow: Izvestiya, 31 December 1997), Articles 4 and 13. For an analysis of this law, see MV. Baglay, Konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: NORMA—INFRAM, 1998), 571–5.

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  2. Konstitutsiya (1993) Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: RAU Press, 1993), Articles 111 and 117.

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  3. Ibid., Article 111 of the Russian Constitution does not state whether the President can nominate the same person more than once for Prime Minister. This was challenged when the President resubmitted Kiriyenko for Prime Minister in April 1998, but it was decided that there was nothing in the Constitution which prevented him from doing so.

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  4. In May 1999, because of contradictions and omissions in the Constitution, the problem was addressed regarding what the constitutional outcome would be when impeachment proceedings had commenced and the Duma rejected the President’s nomination for Prime Minister three times. (See Articles 109 and 111 of the 1993 Russian Constitution.) As the Constitution does not state how this issue should be decided, whether the President’s nominated candidate would become Prime Minister or remain acting Prime Minister and whether the Duma would still be dissolved, and the Constitutional Court never ruled on this, people began to conjecture what the outcome would be in May 1999 when the Duma seemed likely to vote for impeaching the President and Yel’tsin had dismissed Primakov’s Government. The Duma fell 17 votes short of the 300 required to proceed with impeachment so this discrepancy was not resolved (Gosudarstvennaya Duma: Stenogramma zasedaniy Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow: Izvestiya, 15 May 1999). Russia’s acting Justice Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov stated on 14 May 1999 that President Boris Yel’tsin can constitutionally disband the Duma even after impeachment proceedings have started because Article 109, which explains that the Duma cannot be dissolved once the impeachment process begins, does not override Article 111, requiring the President to dismiss the Duma if it does not confirm his choice of Prime Minister a third time (Nezavisimaya gazeta (14 May 1999): 1). According to the Constitution, however, this is not correct. Article 109 states that ‘the State Duma may be dissolved by the President of the Russian Federation in the circumstances provided for in Articles 111 and 117 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation … The State Duma may not be dissolved (in the circumstances provided for in Articles 111 and 117) from the moment it lays a charge against the President of the Russian Federation until the adoption of the appropriate decision by the Council of the Federation’ (Konstitutsiya (1993) Rossiyskoy Federatsii Moscow: RAU Press, 1993).

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  5. Federal Constitutional Law, no. 2, ‘On the Government of the Russian Federation’, Sbornik Federal’nykh Konstitutsionnykh Zakonov i Federal’nykh Zakonov (Moscow: Izvestiya, 31 December 1997). For more details about the debates on this law and the President’s repeated refusals to sign it, see Yevgeniy Yuryev, Segodnya (12 April 1997): 3 and Gleb Cherkasov and Vladimir Shpak, Kommersant Daily (29 November 1997): 1.

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  6. Viktor Chernomyrdin received 60.7 percent of the vote in the Congress of People’s Deputies on 14 December 1992 so Yegor Gaidar was forced to resign as Prime Minister (Gleb Cherkasov, Segodnya (13 August 1996): 1).

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  7. See Tables 6.2 to 6.4 in this chapter.

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  8. Article 111(2) of the 1993 Russian Constitution mandates that the President must submit a nomination for Prime Minister to the Duma within two weeks of a presidential election (Konstitutsiya (1993) Rossiyskoy Federatsii Moscow: RAU Press, 1993).

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  9. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy withdrew a motion to raise a confidence vote in the Government on 7 April 1997 after Deputies who endorsed the decision to hold such a vote revoked their support. This is not considered in this chapter because Deputies did not use it to threaten the executive and retracted the motion before it was even debated.

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  10. Yevgeniy Yuryev, Kommersant Daily (22 June 1995): 3.

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  11. G.D.G. Murrell, Russia’s Transition to Democracy: An Internal Political History (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997), 232.

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  12. Yevgeny Yuryev, Kommersant Daily (22 June 1995): 1, 3.

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  13. Grigory Yavlinskiy, as quoted in Aleksey Kirpichnikov, Segodnya (22 June 1995): 2.

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  14. Gleb Cherkasov and Dmitry Volkov, Segodnya (29 June 1995): 1.

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  15. Boris Yel’tsin as quoted by his Press Service, printed in Rossiyskaya gazeta (23 June 1995): 1.

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  16. Viktor Chernomyrdin countered this second vote by requesting a confidence motion in the Government, ‘which if not passed would have led to either the Duma or the Government falling within a week. Threatened with imminent dissolution, a second vote of no-confidence on 1 July failed to pass, and thereupon Chernomyrdin withdrew his confidence motion’ (Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996), 153).

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  17. Ivan Rybkin, as quoted in Kommersant Daily (24 June 1995): 3.

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  18. Yevgeniy Yuryev, KommersantDaily (28 June 1995): 3.

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  19. See Table 6.3.

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  20. Aleksey Avtonomov, Interview by the author at the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia, Moscow, 29 March 1999.

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  21. See Fig. 9.2 in Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister, How Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1997), 186, which shows the percentage of Deputies in parties voting no-confidence on 1 July 1995. White, Rose and McAllister also argue that there was a ‘high degree of cohesiveness in voting for or against the Government’ on this motion (186).

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  22. Azat Khamaev, Interview by the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 1 April 1998.

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  23. Vil’yam Smirnov, Interview by the author at the Institute of State and Law, Moscow, 5 September 1997.

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  24. See Table 6.4. Thomas Remington found that ‘parliamentary parties have achieved cross-party agreement on a number of legislative matters … among the (7) most important cases of cooperation among parties are the following: the Duma confirmation of Viktor Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister in August 1996… (and) the defeat of the motions of no-confidence in the Government on two separate occasions in 1994 and 1995’ (‘Political Conflict and Institutional Design: Paths of Party Development in Russia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 14, 1–2 (March/June 1998): 206–7).

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  25. Dmitry Zaks, Warning Ups Stakes in Budget Standoff’, Moscow Times (15 October 1997): 1.

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  26. Gleb Cherkasov, Kommersant Daily (16 October 1997): 1.

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  27. Boris Yel’tsin, radio address on 17 October 1997 transcribed in Rossiyskiye vesti (18 October 1997): 3.

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  28. Nikolay Ryzhkov, as quoted in Christian Lowe, ‘Yel’tsin Delays Tax Code in Duma Truce’, Moscow Times (22 October 1997): 2.

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  29. See fn. 7 in this chapter.

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  30. Nikolay Podlipskiy, Kommersant Daily (22 October 1997): 1.

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  31. Resolution of the State Duma, ‘On the Social and Economic Policy of the Russian Federation Government’, Sbornik Federal’nykh Konstitutsionnykh Zakonov i Federal’nykh Zakonov (Moscow: Izvestiya, November 1994).

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  32. Aleksey Kirpichnikov, Segodnya (5 November 1994): 2.

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  33. Boris Fyodorov, as quoted in Segodnya (5 November 1994): 1.

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  34. Egor Gaidar, as quoted in Izvestiya (5 November 1994): 2.

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  35. Vasily Kononenko, Izvestiya (5 November 1994): 2.

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  36. Sergey Parkhomenko, Segodnya (5 November 1994): 1.

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  37. Deputies voted no-confidence in Viktor Yerin, Minister of Internal Affairs, for a second time on 10 March 1995 (Segodnya (11 March 1995): 1) and Yel’tsin removed him in June 1995 as a concession to Deputies.

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  38. Chubais regained his position in the Government on 7 March 1997, when he was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister (Presidential Decree, ‘On A. Chubais’, Sbornik Federal’nykh Konstitutsionnykh Zakonov i Federal’nykh Zakonov (Moscow: Izvestiya, March 1997).

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  39. Gleb Cherkasov and Daniil Osmolovskiy, Kommersant Daily (20 November 1997): 1.

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  40. Daniil Osmolovskiy, Kommersant Daily (21 November 1997): 1.

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  41. Ibid.

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  42. Elena Shestopal explained that ‘Chubais and Nemtsov are perceived in very negative colors by Deputies and in order to deal with the Duma they usually use some pressure and domination. They do not have good relations with the Duma’ (Interview with the author at Moscow State University, Moscow, 9 September 1997).

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  43. Azat Khamaev, Interview by the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 1 April 1998. This was confirmed by Elena Shestopal who stated that ‘people who become Deputies are to a large extent very interested in continuing their political careers and the Government can always promise them something’ (Interview by the author at Moscow State University, Moscow, 9 September 1997).

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  44. Vladimir Averchev, Interview by the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 19 September 1997.

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  45. Federal Constitutional Law, no. 2, ‘On the Government of the Russian Federation’, Sbornik Federal’nykh Konstitutsionnykh Zakonov i Federal’nykh Zakonov (Moscow: Izvestiya, 31 December 1997).

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  46. Boris Yel’tsin, televised address on 23 March 1998, as transcribed in Trud (24 March 1998): 1.

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  47. Lyudmila Telen, Moskovskiye novosti, no. 11 (22–29 March 1998): 2.

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  48. Yel’tsin appointed Chernomyrdin as a special Russian envoy to Kosovo in Spring 1999 during the war in Kosovo.

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  49. An undisclosed Government official, as quoted in Sergey Parkhomenko, Itogi, no. 12 (31 March 1998): 14–17.

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  50. Lilia Shevtsova, Interview by the author at the Carnegie Center, Moscow, 23 March 1998 and Lilia Shevtsova, Moskovskiye novosti, no. 12 (29 March-5 April 1998): 10.

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  51. Headlines, such as ‘Sergey Who?’ (Moscow News, no. 11 (26 March-1 April 1998): 1), on the day after Kiriyenko’s nomination demonstrated that he was relatively unknown and an unlikely candidate for Prime Minister.

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  52. According to Article 92 of the 1993 Constitution, ‘in all instances where the President of the Russian Federation is unable to perform his duties, they shall be temporarily carried out by the Chair of the Government (Prime Minister)’ Konstitutsiya (1993) Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moscow: RAU Press, 1993).

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  53. This view was confirmed prior to the Duma’s first vote on Kiriyenko by Deputy Igor’ Mal’kov, Interview with the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 3 April 1998 and Azat Khamaev, Interview by the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 1 April 1998.

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  54. Konstitutsiya (1993) Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Article 111(3).

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  55. Gennadiy Seleznyov, in OMRI Daily Digest 2, 75 (20 April 1998): 1.

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  56. Laura Belin, ‘Zyuganov Says New Elections “Could Be Useful” ‘, OMRI Daily Digest, no. 75 (20 April 1998): 1.

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  57. Boris Yel’tsin, nationwide radio address, 10 April 1998.

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  58. Azat Khamaev, Interview by the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 1 April 1998. Boris Kuznetsov also stated this in an interview with the author at the State Duma, Moscow, 8 April 1998.

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  59. Konstitutsiya (1993) Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Article 111(3).

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  60. Alastair Macdonald, ‘Premier Delay Shows Constitution Wrangling’, Moscow Times (4 April 1998): 2.

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  61. Sergey Kiriyenko, comment to reporters on 10 April 1998, at which the author was present, immediately following the first vote on his approval as Prime Minister in the State Duma.

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  62. Gennadiy Seleznyov’s comments on his meeting with Boris Yel’tsin on 14 April 1998, as printed in Izvestiya (15 April 1998): 1.

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  63. Boris Yel’tsin, as quoted by Georgy Bovt, Segodnya (14 April 1998): 1, 3.

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  64. As explained by Gleb Cherkasov, Sergey Aksyonov and Marina Rassafonova in Kommersant Daily (23 April 1998): 1, because of contradictions in the electoral law, the President could legally modify the law by presidential decree.

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  65. Gennadiy Seleznyov confirmed (in Izvestiya (15 April 1998): 1) that the Duma’s fate as an institution was more important than whether Kiriyenko was Prime Minister.

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  66. Ibid., 3.

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  67. See Vyacheslav Nikonov, Izvestiya (12 May 1998): 2.

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  68. Konstantin Levin, Kommersant Daily (5 May 1998): 1.

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  69. Pyotr Akopov, Nezavisimaya gazeta (1 July 1998): 1, 4.

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  70. Natalya Timakova, Kommersant Daily (15 July 1998): 1.

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  71. Tat’yana Koshkaryova and Rustam Narzikulov, Nezavisimaya gazeta (14 August 1998): 1, 3.

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  72. Aleksey Avtonomov, Interview by the author at the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism in Russia, Moscow, 29 March 1999.

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  73. See quotes from most of the Duma’s elite in Segodnya (22 August 1998): 1, in which they ask for Kiriyenko to be dismissed and warn that they will vote no-confidence in the Government in two days.

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  74. Boris Yel’tsin, televised address on 24 August 1998, transcribed in Kommersant Daily (25 August 1998): 1.

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  75. Gennadiy Zyuganov, statement released on 26 August 1998, printed in Izvestiya (27 August 1998): 1.

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  78. Ibid.

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  79. Irina Granik, Kommersant Daily (1 September 1998): 1.

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  80. Svetlana Ilyina, Nezavisimaya gazeta (8 September 1998): 1, 3.

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  1. Tiffany A. Troxel
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© 2003 Tiffany A. Troxel

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Troxel, T.A. (2003). Actual Non-legislative Powers of the Russian President and Parliament: Cabinet Formation and Dismissal. In: Parliamentary Power in Russia, 1994–2001. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505735_6

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