Abstract
There can hardly be any doubt but that the Gallipoli campaign was ‘manoeuvrist’ in strategic conception; it was part and parcel of the so-called ‘British Way in Warfare’, an approach to conflict which maximised Britain’s maritime advantages and avoided pitched battle on the continent of Europe, but called instead for the imaginative use of an expeditionary army against the exposed vulnerabilities of a land-bound adversary. General Sir Ian Hamilton, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Mediterranean Force, was well aware of the advantages that British seapower had to confer in this respect. A convinced Easterner, he advocated a defensive in the West and an offensive in the East. Otherwise, it would be a case of ‘not exploiting our own special characteristics, mobility and sea power!’2
The Fleet and Army acting in conjunction seem to be the natural bulwark of this kingdom.1
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Notes
General Sir Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary (London: 1920), Vol. II, pp.141–2], 183. The title of this book is in some respects misleading; its contents were plainly written-up well after the events described.
Arthur J. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran (London: 1974) p.1.
Brig.-General C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol. II (London: 1932).
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Memories (London: 1919) p.57.
The disputes between the two men are fully if somewhat tendentiously described in Geoffrey Penn, Fisher, Churchill and the Dardanelles (London: 1999), esp. pp.170ff and 186.
For Fisher’s views on Keyes see his letter to Beatty of 3 February and to Jellicoe 4 April 1915, in A.J. Marder (ed.), Fear God and Dread Nought, Vol. III (London: 1959). See also The Keyes Papers, Vol. I (London: 1972) p.229.
Quoted in Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (London: 1983) p.271.
Quoted in J. Laffin, Damn the Dardanelles: The Story of Gallipoli (London: 1980) p.23.
Sir Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command 1914–1918, Vol. I (London: 1961) p.293.
For evidence see Violet Bonham Carter, Winston Churchill As I Knew Him (London: 1965) pp.239–40 et seq, and pp.350–76.
Entry for 5 November 1915 in B. Bond and S. Robbins (eds), Staff Officer: The Diaries of Lord Moyne (London: Leo Cooper, 1987) p.49.
T.H.E. Travers, ‘Command and Leadership Styles in the British Army: The 1915 Gallipoli Model’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 29 (1994), pp.403–42.
Compton Mackenzie, Gallipoli Memories (London: 1929) p.83.
Sir Julian Corbett, Naval Operations (London: 1921), Vol. III, p.7.
This was a common view at the time. See Colonel John Buchan, A History of the British Navy During the War (London: 1918) p.228;
and for an unadmiring commentary on the nature of Army Command, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (London: 1936) p.2,042.
Keyes to Chatfield, 14 August 1937, in Paul Halpern, The Keyes Papers, Vol. II (London: 1980) p.371.
‘Functions of a Battle Cruiser Squadron’, 5 April 1913 in B.McL. Ranft (ed.), The Beatty Papers, Vol. I (London: 1989) p.59 et seq.
See Ian Beckett, ‘Command in the Late Victorian Army’, in G.D. Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: the Anglo-American Experience Since 1861 (London: 1996) pp.37–56.
J.H. Godfrey, ‘The Naval Memoirs of Admiral J.H. Godfrey’, unpublished, 1964, Vol. II, p.4.
For an interesting discussion of the Obervation-Orientation-Decision-Action loop, see David S. Fadok, ‘John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis’ (SAAS, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1995) p.16.
Callwell, for example, believed strongly that all the troops should have been landed on the littoral north of Gaba Tepe in the area subsequently known as Anzac Cove: Major-General Sir Charles Callwell, The Dardanelles (London: 1919) pp.128–9.
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester Wemyss, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign (London: 1924) pp.40–2.
Peter Liddle, Men of Gallipoli (London: Allen Lane, 1976) p.98.
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© 2003 Geoffrey Till
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Till, G. (2003). The Gallipoli Campaign: Command Performances. In: Sheffield, G., Till, G. (eds) The Challenges of High Command. Cormorant Security Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230505353_4
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