Economic Disobedience

Abstract

In the late 1950s it appeared that Khrushchev’s economic policy was paying off. Growth rates were relatively good; the launch of the first sputnik and Gagarin’s subsequent voyage in space seemed to signal that Soviet industry had become technologically advanced. For the first time consumer goods were available in reasonable quantities to ordinary citizens, and there was beginning to be some slow improvement in the desperate housing situation in the cities. Moreover, there had been a series of social reforms regarding pensions, a minimum wage, maternity leave and the like. All these factors contributed to growing optimism among both the political leadership and the population at large. But it was mainly the former who, in the first rush of enthusiasm, went so far as to predict the imminent advent of communism. Among ordinary citizens such enthusiasm was a good deal more muted. Results never quite lived up to promises; and particularly when growth rates began markedly to decline in the second half of Khrushchev’s reign, dissatisfaction began to be voiced. The British economist and historian Alec Nove believes that the main reason for this decline lay in the Soviet planned system itself, which, despite all attempts to decentralize the decision-making process and make the system more rational, remained an impediment to economic progress.¹