Schelling’s Dynamic Account of the Absolute and Finitude

Abstract

Despite Hegel’s and Heidegger’s monochromatic interpretations of Schelling’s thought, his conception of Identity is diffused throughout his various works and in many different versions, as if the concept itself undergoes multiple transmutations. Indeed, Schelling develops his philosophy in a surprisingly versatile way – now characterised as kaleidoscopic, now as inconsistent – which is exceptionally interesting and diversified with regard both to form and terminology. In the previous chapter, we examined Schelling’s monolithic account of the Absolute, during his Identity System phase. It is the aridity of this period that justified Hegel’s overwhelming critique and also Heidegger’s simplified interpretation of Schelling’s Of Human Freedom, along with the consequent classification of Schelling under the category of the defenders of the notion of the Absolute. In this chapter, we will try to get a purchase on Schelling’s dynamic and original account of the concept of the Absolute and finitude as the latter have been elaborately expounded in the second draft of the AW.