Abstract
Some think that democracy should tolerate all forms and types of speech, for liberals must not play the anti-liberal game. Those who make this sweeping claim argue that liberal democracies are different from other forms of government precisely because they do not use non-liberal tools.2 I find this claim naive and dangerous. Democracy should set rules for speech as well as for action. Those who choose to break and to undermine the basic democratic rules should not be surprised if, in the name of democratic self-defence, the legislature might decide to disqualify them from participation in the democratic process. I reiterate the importance of acknowledging the democratic ‘catch’ and the need for setting limits to the democratic principles.
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Notes
Anthony Skillen, ‘Freedom of Speech’, in Keith Graham (ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 139–59.
Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977). R. Cohen-Almagor, The Boundaries of Liberty and Tolerance (Gainesville, FL: The University Press of Florida, 1994).
R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical Appraisal’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1997), pp. 82–105.
James Bryce, Modern Democracies (London: Macmillan, 1921), Vol. I, p. 4.
Deni Elliott, ‘Universal Values and Moral Development Theories’, in Clifford Christians and Michael Traber (eds), Communication Ethics and Universal Values (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage, 1997), pp. 68–83.
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R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Why Tolerate? Reflections on the Millian Truth Principle’, Philosophia, Vol. 25, Nos. 1–4 (1997), pp. 131–52.
Howard Kurtz, ‘Why the Press Is Always Right’, Columbia Journalism Review, Vol. 32 (May–June 1993), pp. 33–5, at 34.
Stephen D. Reese, ‘The News Paradigm and the Ideology of Objectivity: A Socialist at the Wall Street Journal’, Critical Studies in Mass Communication, Vol. 7 (1990), pp. 390–409, at 390.
Gary Sick, ‘Taking Vows: The Domestication of Policy-Making in Hostage Incidents’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 230–44, at 242.
Alicia C. Shepard, ‘Legislating Ethics’, American Journalism Review, Vol. 16 ( January–February 1994), pp. 37–41.
Clifford Christians, ‘Self-Regulation: A Critical Role for Codes of Ethics’, in Everette E. Dennis, Donald M. Gillmor and Theodore L. Glasser (eds), Media Freedom and Accountability (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 35–53.
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© 2001 Raphael Cohen-Almagor
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Cohen-Almagor, R. (2001). Ethical Boundaries of Media Coverage. In: Speech, Media and Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501829_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501829_5
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