Britain and the Problem of Berlin

Abstract

The Berlin crisis was a continuation of a long-standing dispute between the former allies of World War II. In section I of this chapter, the antecedents of the crisis will be traced back to their wartime origins. The Berlin problem’s historical context as part of the development of the Cold War and the division of Europe lay at the heart of the subsequent crisis. In section II, the importance of Berlin to British foreign policy-makers is assessed. Harold Macmillan’s background and pre-eminence in British foreign policy-making as prime minister, along with Britain’s self-image and ambivalence towards Germany and the Germans, critically shaped Britain’s policy towards Berlin. The search for German reunification and the desire for agreement with the USSR on European security developed as two conflicting strands in British thinking. From the early attempts to secure agreement with the Soviet Union on ending the wartime division of Germany, to the tacit acceptance of the status quo, British leaders conceived of a leading role for themselves for much of the post-war period - an inheritance that coloured Macmillan’s approach. Tracing the course of British policy on Germany, it emerges that Macmillan was logically and emotionally predisposed to an accommodation with the USSR at the expense of West German security interests, and this shaped his whole policy towards Berlin.