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Abstract

At least since James I, the struggle for influence has been continuous and so has the struggle to define legitimate sources of influence. The politics of advice thus forms part of the continuous dialogue of government. In America the constitutional separation of powers requires that it is a dialogue conducted between the legislative and executive branch of government, with the judicial branch occasionally being called upon to adjudicate between the two. In Britain, since the nineteenth century, a secret constitutional separation of powers has existed between the permanent government in Whitehall and the transitory government from Westminster.3 In Britain, therefore, it is a dialogue conducted within the executive branch itself.

Liberties can be taken with a constitution written in invisible ink, within the rules of law and commonsense, without apoplectic consequences1

The British constitution has long been a source of fascination to political scientists and indifference to everyone else… The machinery is notoriously short on brakes: the checks and balances which are a feature of written constitutions. The symptoms of trouble are an accident-prone cabinet [and] leaks and rumblings of non-consultation from government ministers… 2

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Notes

  1. Deedes, W.F., ‘Reinforcements for No.10?’ Telegraph 15 November, 1982 p. 14.

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  2. See Neustadt, Richard, E., ‘10 Downing Street’ in King, Anthony, ed. The British Prime Minister 1st edn (London: Macmillan, 1969) pp. 119–30, p. 126.

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  3. See Willetts, David, ‘The role of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit’ Public Administration Vol.65, Winter 1978 pp. 443–54.

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  4. Sharpe, Kevin, Political Ideas in Early Stuart England (London: Pinter, 1989) p.

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  5. Hennessy, Peter, Whitehall (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 314.

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  6. Burch, Martin, ‘The Prime Minister and Cabinet from Thatcher to Major’ Talking Politics Vol.7, No.1, Autumn 1994 pp. 27–33, p. 32.

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  7. See Foley, Michael, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: University Press, 1993) p. 265.

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  8. Ranelagh, John, Thatcher’s People (London: Fontana, 1992) p. 223.

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  9. Young, Hugo, One of Us final edn (London: Pan Books, 1993) p. 154.

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  10. See Watt, David, ‘Civil Servants and Kitchen Cabinets’ Financial Times 27 October, 1972 p. 23.

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© 1997 Sue Pryce

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Pryce, S. (1997). Conclusion. In: Presidentializing the Premiership. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379992_9

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