Abstract
In December 1949, the British Foreign Office asked the War Office for an assessment of the dangers of war in Korea. The War Office replied that the North Korean objective undoubtedly was to overrun the South, but an invasion seemed unlikely: they would probably proceed by subversion. If an invasion did take place,
I think it improbable that the Americans would become involved. The possession of South Korea is not essential for Allied strategic plans, and though it would obviously be desirable to deny it to the enemy, it would not be of sufficient importance to make it the cause of World War III. Meanwhile, we must … hope for the best.1
The author of this report, Major Ferguson Innes, did not lack confidence. Unfortunately, he was wrong on all counts.
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Notes and References
Max Hastings, The Korean War (Michael Joseph, 1987) p. 59.
Hastings, The Korean War, p. 118: William Manchester, MacArthur: American Caesar (Little, Brown, 1978) pp. 683–8.
Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Doubleday, 1956) p. 385.
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© 1996 Sir Robin Renwick
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Renwick, R. (1996). ‘I think it improbable that the Americans would become involved’. In: Fighting with Allies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379824_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379824_16
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