Abstract
The emergence of nation states early in the social history of humanity was usually the result of the ability of one or more individuals to successfully wage war on people. The winner would be appointed as the head of state, usually the monarch or emperor. Having come to power, the usual outcome was the individual would seek to ensure that, upon their death, succession would pass to their male heir. Within this system, the monarch or emperor retained absolute control over the population by passing laws and a willingness to use violence or the threat of violence to ensure that there was no effective opposition. Although this leader held absolute power, in many cases their decisions were influenced or determined by a small group of advisors, who were typically granted titles and given tracts of lands (or ‘estates’) to ensure their loyalty.
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© 2012 Ian Chaston
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Chaston, I. (2012). Politicians. In: Public Sector Reformation. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379350_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379350_3
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