Abstract
Despite overwhelming evidence, the claim that art is useless may be resisted. That art is concerned primarily with the generation of beauty and that beauty has nothing to do with morality, usefulness or even edification, is an ancient position — reaching back as far as Plato and the quarrel between the poets and the philosophers; but in recent centuries it has usually been associated with a frivolous desire to shock or at least has been served up in a nimbus of silliness. ‘All art is quite useless’ invokes, of course, Dorian Gray and the martyrdom of Wilde, the camp smirk, the desire épater le bourgeois, or, to use Barthes’ phrase, ‘to show one’s behind to the Political Father’. The uselessness of art therefore needs rescuing from its status as a dated cliché, from the after-sniggers of the Decadents, as much as it needs defending against the anger of those, such as Tolstoy, for whom, as we noted in ‘The Freezing Coachman’, all but the simplest, most nakedly didactic art was condemned by its inutility. The uselessness of consciousness is (except as a larger condemnation of the uselessness of existence) less of a cliché. The point of this chapter is to reanimate the familiar idea of the uselessness of art by relating it to the less familiar idea of the uselessness of consciousness.
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Notes
See Raymond Tallis, In Defence of Realism (London: Edward Arnold, 1988).
Raymond Tallis, The Explicit Animal (London: Macmillan, 1991).
Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (London: Penguin, 1988).
Richard Goldschmidt, The Material Basis of Evolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940). This is discussed sympathetically in Karl Popper’s ‘The Hopeful Behavioural Monster’, in Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972)
Mary Midgely, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature (London: Methuen, 1979). For a more detailed discussion of this — with examples — see The Explicit Animal, Chapter 2.
It might be argued — if it is accepted that consciousness is maladaptive — that it was once of adaptive value and then had maladaptive consequences. Every solution creates a new problem, or a new problem-situation. There are certainly well-known examples of this in evolution, for example, the possession of the sickle cell trait associated with abnormal haemoglobin conferred a relative immunity against malaria. In West Africa, where malaria was pan-endemic, the adverse consequence of possessing this trait — liability to sickle cell anaemia — was a price worth paying. For a modern West African, where malaria is controlled or treatable, the trait, which confers much suffering, is clearly no longer of net benefit. The disadvantage is even more evident for individuals of West African ancestry living in non-malarial zones such as Camden. By analogy with this example, one could argue that the cunning that was developed in order to enable man to be a more successful hunter of animal prey or to deal with a hostile environment becomes maladaptive when it is turned against his fellow-men, who can be hunted or persecuted more effectively than in the absence of this faculty.
Charles Darwin, The Origin of the Species (London: Watts & Co., Thinker’s Library Edition, 1929) p. 194.
Raymond Tallis, In Defence of Realism, p. 212.
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Tallis, R. (1995). A Metaphysical Interlude: The Uselessness of Consciousness. In: Newton’s Sleep. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379244_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379244_9
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