Abstract
After the failure of the German plan for a lightning war in 1914, both the Western and Eastern Fronts congealed into three years of static trench warfare in which most of the 8 million fatal battle casualties occurred. Attempts at a wide strategic outflanking movement by the British in attacking the Turks in Gallipoli (1915) and Mesopotamia (Iraq, 1914–17) failed. First to crack were the Russians — both cause and effect of their 1917 Revolution. The Germans, free to concentrate on the Western Front, very nearly broke it in March 1918, but the Allies counter-attacked in August, including fresh troops from the British Empire and the newly arrived expeditionary force from the USA, which was in action for the first time. The US government warned the Germans that this force was just the beginning, and that they were geared to continue the war into the 1920s. The morale of the exhausted German troops, already depressed by the failure of their spring offensive, began to collapse. The naval blockade, now also reinforced by the US navy, was causing severe shortages in Germany. Faced with the growing spectre of a Communist revolution, Field Marshal Hindenburg (Chief of the General Staff — effectively supreme commander on behalf of the Kaiser — since 1916) persuaded the Kaiser that Germany must ask for an armistice before their troops were driven back in chaos onto German soil1.
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Notes and References
R. C. Birch Britain and Europe 1871–1939, London, Pergamon, 1966, p. 148
James Joll, Europe since 1870, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976, p. 279
Martin Gilbert, Recent History Atlas 1860 to 1960, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967, pp. 53 and 61. Like Serbs and Croats in the new states created by the disintegration of Yugloslavia in 1991–92, these Germans were, of course, intermingled with Czechs and Poles, so no ‘fair’ border could be drawn. In the areas transferred to Germany by the Munich Agreement in September 1938, there would have been a two to one majority vote in favour of joining Germany, but Hitler revealed that his true intention was merely to use diese areas as a stepping stone when, within five months, he marched his soldiers into Prague.
Richard Bessel, ‘1933: A Failed Counter-Revolution’, in E. E. Rice (ed) Revolution and Counter Revolution, Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 109–25. He contends that Hindenburg and the conservative politicians led by Von Papen were attempting a counter-revolution against what they saw as a dangerously liberal programme proposed by Schleicher’s administration. Bessel suggests that they aimed to use Hitler as a tool, but that he hijacked their counter-revolution.
J P Stern, Hitler: The Fuhrer and the People, London, Fontana, 1975, p. 135
F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, A Hundred Years of International Relations, London, Duckworth, 1971, p. 126
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© 1993 Richard Clutterbuck
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Clutterbuck, R. (1993). The Rise of Hitler. In: International Crisis and Conflict. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379015_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379015_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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