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Abstract

The run-up to the Gulf crisis in 1990 showed US foreign policy at its worst. Once Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, however, US diplomacy and crisis management were brilliant; the handling of the war itself in January and February 1991 was a triumph of military science and generalship. On the aftermath leaving Saddam Hussein in power with enough military strength to crush an attempted Kurdish rebellion in the north and a Shia rebellion in the south — it is too early to make a final judgement.

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© 1993 Richard Clutterbuck

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Clutterbuck, R. (1993). The Gulf Crisis 1990–91. In: International Crisis and Conflict. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379015_14

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