Abstract
In July 1940, with a commitment being made for a southward push, the Japanese Army (IJA) and Navy (IJN) put all their efforts into producing a battle plan for war in South East Asia against the Americans, British and Dutch territories, and they produced a plan for this by the summer of 1941. However, there was a key difference in the plans put forward by the Japanese Army and Navy regarding the invasion of South East Asia. After the Russo-Japanese War, the IJN had based their strategy on a Pacific-centred anti-Anglo-America strategy, their main plan being a ‘clockwise strategy’ moving from the Philippines, to Java, Sumatra and Malaya. This stressed the importance of removing the danger of an attack by the USA by invading the Philippines. However, the IJA favoured an anti-clockwise movement, landing first in Malaya, and moving in an opposite direction to that proposed by the IJN. It was thought that if the Far Eastern British Empire was invaded, Japan could avoid the involvement of the USA in the war. The movement of the IJA into South East Asia also limited its enemies to British and Dutch territories, and meant that an attack on the Philippines could be avoided or delayed. In the end, there was a lack of information about each route’s advantages and disadvantages making any decision difficult, and on 5 November 1941, the Emperor issued a decree, The Army and Navy’s Southern Strategy Agreement’, which stated that both the Philippines and Malaya would be swiftly attacked, with a left and right southerly movement crossing into the Dutch East Indies.
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Notes
Nagasaki, ‘Indo Kokumingun no Keisei’, pp. 38–43; Milan Hauner, India in the Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), pp. 490–3.
The total dead of 163000 is based on Boei Kenkyusho materials. According to Louis Allen, the war dead of British Forces was estimated at 71200 compared to 106100 Japanese; Louis Allen, Burma: the Longest War (London: Dent, 1984).
Peter Dennis, Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South-East Asia Command, 1945–46. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 89–162
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© 2003 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Hatano, S. (2003). The Anglo-Japanese War and Japan’s Plan to ‘Liberate’ Asia, 1941–1945. In: Gow, I., Hirama, Y., Chapman, J. (eds) The Military Dimension. The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378872_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378872_13
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