Skip to main content

International Oil Diplomacy and War

  • Chapter
  • 78 Accesses

Part of the book series: St Antony’s Series ((STANTS))

Abstract

The new plan for solving the deadlock originated at the Quai d’Orsay. The closure of the pipeline had deprived France of half a million tons of relatively cheap crude oil which she found difficult to obtain elsewhere at the same price, notwithstanding the continued flow of Iraqi oil to Tripoli.1 It is understandable, therefore, why — when it became evident that British efforts to persuade the Iraqis to resume the flow of oil to Haifa had failed — France proposed to Israel a scheme designed to smooth out the complexities involved. As formally presented on 22 August to the Israeli Ambassador in Paris it was based on the assumptions that the British wanted ‘both [the pipeline] flow and [the] refinery operating, while France and the USA [are] satisfied [with] crude oil [flow] only’.2 The French proposed that Israel undertake to allow all the crude oil to be shipped if Iraq resumed the flow. Faced with Franco-American accord, the British would consent and Israel’s requirements of refined fuel would be met by ‘beneficiaries’ oil provided from other sources. The fate of the refinery was to be decided at a later date.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. The foUowing is based on IDFA 597/56/66; ISA 1664/3; IDFA 597/56/60; CZA S 40/85-1; FO 371/68610; ISA 2971/601/2/6; and U. Bialer, ‘Sterüng Balances and Claims Negotiations: Britain and Israel 1947–1952’, Middle Eastern Studies, 28, 1, 1992, pp. 157–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 1999 Uri Bialer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bialer, U. (1999). International Oil Diplomacy and War. In: Oil and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–63. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377745_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics