Abstract
In the original book, Chapter 5 was called ‘Supply’, Chapter 6, ‘Complete Micro Models’, and Chapter 7, ‘Behaviour and Evidence’. The first two of these, taken together, closed the model based on the general assumptions described in the preceding chapters. The third was concerned with empirical testing and also with the question of maximizing versus satisficing behaviour, or what would now be called the debate over bounded rationality.
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Further Reading
Bartley, J. and C. Boardman (1986) ‘Replacement-cost-adjusted Valuation Ratio as a Discriminator Among Take-over Target and Nontarget Firms’, Journal of Economics and Business, vol. 38, pp. 41–55. (The definitive study of the hypothesis that the primary determinant of a firm’s liability to take-over is the ratio of stock market value to underlying assets.)
Baumol, W. (1959) Business Behavior, Value and Growth (New York: Macmillan). (The first theoretical economic model of a managerial strategy that maximizes gross sales subject to earning adequate profit.)
Cubbin, J. and G. Hall (1983) ‘Directors’ Remuneration in the Theory of the Firm C Specification and Testing of the Null Hypothesis’, European Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 1–3, pp. 333–48. (Outstanding theoretical and empirical analysis of executive compensation and managerial versus neo-classical theories of the firm; needs intermediate economics; uses calculus.)
Cubbin, J. and D. Leech (1986) ‘Growth versus Profit-maximization: A Simultaneous-equations Approach to Testing the Marris Model’, Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 7, no. 2, 123–31. (Impressive uses of advanced econometric techniques to test the several elements of the theory.)
Gomez-Mejia, L., H. Tosi, and T. Hinkin (1987) ‘Managerial Control, Performance and Executive Compensation’, Academy of Management Journal, vol. 30, no. 1, March, pp. 51–70. (The most comprehensive study in a large literature on the subject of executive compensation.)
Hill, C. and S. Snell (1989) ‘Effects of Ownership Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity’, Academy of Management Journal, vol. 32, no. 1, March, pp. 25–46. (Definitive testing of managerial theories of the firm based on cross-sectional hierarchical regression analysis of over 100 Fortune-500 firms.)
Hunt, H. (1986) ‘The Separation of Ownership from Control: Theory, Evidence and Implications’, Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 5, pp. 85–124. (Important survey of previous studies on the predictions of and results from managerial theories of the firm.)
Marris, R. (1964) The Economic Theory of ‘Managerial’ Capitalism (London: Macmillan). (Core contribution to Growth-orientated managerial theories; lively text peppered with equations.)
Marris, R. and D. Mueller (1980) ‘The Corporation and Competition’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 18, March, pp. 32–63. (Essay-cum-survey on neoclassical and managerial theories of the firm and non-price competition in the twentieth century.)
Monsen, R. and A. Downs (1965) ‘A Theory of Large Managerial Firms’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 73, no. 3, June, pp. 221–36. (Lucid structured verbal argument, based on internal organization, that large corporations necessarily suffer bureaucratic inefficiency.)
Mueller, D. (1969) ‘A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 83, November, pp. 643–60. (The first theory of merger and take-over from the point of view of acquiring firms.)
Mueller, D. (1972) ‘A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm’, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 20, no. 3, July, pp. 199–219. (The original statement and first testing of the important life-cycle hypothesis.)
Mueller, D. and E. Reardon (1993) Rates of Return on Corporate Investment (Washington DC: Anti-trust Division, Dept of Justice). (Strong findings that internal returns are generally lower than returns that could have been earned if retained profits had been distributed.)
Odagiri, H. (1992) Growth Through Competition and Competition Through Growth: Strategic Management and the Economy in Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (Explains the Japanese economic miracle with the aid of the managerial theory.)
Penrose, E. (1958) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Basil Blackwell; New York: John Wiley). (The foundation work on the idea of the persistently growing firm; highly original non-mathematical account of the internal administrative forces that encourage and restrain the growth-rate.)
Scherer, M. (1988) ‘Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. no. 2, 1, Winter, pp. 69–82. (Comprehensive and detached theoretical, empirical and historical survey of the apparent motives for, and efficiency-effects of, take-overs.)
Williamson, O. (1964) The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall). (The author’s prize-winning Ph.D. dissertation; the classic exposition of his original model of managerial expense preference with important empirical support.)
Williamson, O. (1970) Corporate Control and Business Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall). (Lucid discussion of how exigencies of internal organization affect actual behaviour of managerial firms.)
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© 1998 Robin Marris
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Marris, R. (1998). Managerial Theories of the Firm. In: Managerial Capitalism in Retrospect. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230376168_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230376168_5
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