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Abstract

In extolling the likely benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention, James F. Leonard, a former US Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, argues that it has ‘good prospects’ for ‘eliminating existing chemical arsenals and combating their spread’, thereby rolling back chemical proliferation.1 Many other treaty proponents agree; Ambassador Ledogar declared that ‘we are seeing the beginning of the end of this weapon of mass destruction’. The outcome of the Gulf War, he asserted, had largely undermined the idea that chemical weapons constituted a poor nation’s nuclear deterrent, and now, in the wake of the treaty, ‘we may have seen the last significant large-scale use of chemical weapons in warfare’.2 Whether these predictions come true remains to be seen, but this wave of confidence reflects specific lessons drawn from the Gulf War, doubts about the military utility (compounded by the possible political/economic liability) of chemical and biological warfare, and the hopes vested in the two Conventions. Each issue warrants a final review as they will all have a bearing upon the prospects for the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

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Notes and References

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© 1994 Edward M. Spiers

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Spiers, E.M. (1994). Proliferation Prospects. In: Chemical and Biological Weapons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230375642_8

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