Socialist Patriotism or National Communism?

  • Walter A. Kemp


This chapter discusses how nationalism affected international relations among Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between the death of Stalin in 1953 and the onset of ‘normalization’ in 1969. It suggests that once Communism was clearly established the national Communist Parties, including the leadership of the CPSU, were incapable of burying national differences. In many cases, rather than cementing over differences, the Parties actually became accomplices to the cracking of the so-called Communist monolith. In a situation parallel to that which led to the break-up of the socialist movement in the late nineteenth century, as outlined in Chapter 2, the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s bore out E. H. Carr’s assertion that ‘the socialization of the nation has as its corollary the nationalization of socialism’.1


National Identity Communist Party Communist Regime Soviet Republic North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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© Walter A. Kemp 1999

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  • Walter A. Kemp

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