Fairly Open Borders

Abstract

Practical philosophy had much trouble in dealing with problems of first admission.¹ In this chapter I do not give a comprehensive overview of the state of the art. Instead, I will present a committed, non-technical plea in favour of fairly open borders. Broadly speaking, two different moral arguments in favour of fairly open borders can be developed: the first one tries to show that free mobility is an inherent moral principle and should, therefore, be recognized as a universal and basic human right (Dummet 1992, Carens 1992). The second is a more indirect one which tries to show that states have a moral obligation to let people in as long as and to the degree that they do not live up to their moral obligations to guarantee universal and basic human rights to safety and subsistence. In this argument, free movement and open borders are not seen as intrinsic moral principles but rather as instrumental devices.

In the notes to this chapter I have tried to incorporate many comments, replies and debates from session II of the Amsterdam-colloquium which explains their number and length. I would like to thank Rainer Bauböck, Ewald Engelen, Gijs v. Oenen, Pieter Pekelharing, Thomas Pogge, and the members of the department of Practical Philosophy of my Faculty for their productive and critical comments. Special thanks to Klaske de Jong who streamlined the text and corrected my English. Thanks also to NWO Ethiek en Beleid for a generous grant.