Abstract
Economies are built upon people buying and selling, lending and borrowing. The beauty of the market is that, when it works well, sellers are matched to buyers and lenders are matched to worthy borrowers. But when the market does not work well, goods go unsold and promising investment projects go unfunded. We understand why markets fail - the economics of information provides rigorous underpinnings for why credit markets, in particular, are so problematic.1 The challenge has been to move from diagnosis to prescription. The challenge is particularly great in poorer regions, where individuals may have workable ideas and relevant experience but lack collateral. Even a £100 loan can make a difference to a small-scale shopkeeper or craftsperson in countries like Nepal or Uganda, but formal sector banks have steered clear, focusing instead on larger loans to better-established, wealthier clients.
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© 2004 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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de Aghion, B.A., Morduch, J. (2004). Microfinance: Where do we Stand?. In: Goodhart, C.A.E. (eds) Financial Development and Economic Growth. British Association for the Advancement of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374270_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374270_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-51487-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37427-0
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