The Indirect Approach and Liberation

Abstract

The Eisenhower administration had been searching since 1953 for a more flexible foreign and national security policy in order to cope with the realities of a post-Stalin Soviet Union, which was constantly asserting its genuine commitment to world peace. Accordingly, while the structure of American armed forces was being transformed in response to the New Look doctrine, the New Look itself had been subjected to a number of compromises. These included the postponement of any drastic American troop reductions in Europe, a more circumspect approach towards collective security, a de-emphasis on ‘massive retaliation’ rhetoric, given the greater availability of tactical nuclear weapons, and a less forceful posture towards the Soviet-Communist bloc as a result of the growing realisation of the futility of, and dangers inherent in, general nuclear war. The latter culminated in the massive publicity surrounding the Geneva summit conference whereby the United States was extolled as a peace-loving country.¹