Abstract
Humans engage with the world and one another in sophisticated ways that (arguably) creatures lacking language cannot. Language (again, arguably) enables us to communicate meaningfully, to form contentful attitudes and intentions, and to design and execute plans so as to satisfy our needs and desires. Yet, for this to be so, a great deal that is not captured in terms of explicit content, necessarily, informs everything we expressly say, explicitly think and deliberately do.
If you can’t say it clearly you don’t understand it yourself.
John Searle
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Clark, A. (2002a) ‘Skills, spills and the nature of mindful action’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 385–7.
Crane, T. (2009) ‘Is perception a propositional attitude?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 452–69.
Crane, T. (2011) ‘The Given’, in J. Schear (ed.) The Myth of the Mental?, (London: Routledge).
Dreyfus, H. L. (1993) ‘Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s (and Searle’s) account of intentionality’, Social Research, 93(60), 1–17.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2002a) ‘Intelligence without representation — Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 367–83.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2002b) ‘Refocusing the question: Can there be skilful coping without propositional representations or brain representations?’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 413–25.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007a) ‘The return of the myth of the mental’, Inquiry, 50, 352–65.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007b) ‘Response to McDowell’, Inquiry, 50, 371–7.
Fodor, J. A, and E. LePore (1992) Holism: A Shopper’s Guide (Oxford: Blackwell).
Hutto, D. D. (2006) ‘Unprincipled engagements: Emotional experience, expression and response’, in R. Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. (Amsterdam/Philadelnhia: John Beniamins). 13–38.
Hutto, D. D. (2007) ‘The narrative practice hypothesis: Origins and applications of folk psychology’, in Narrative and Understanding Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 82, 43–68.
Hutto, D. D. (2008a) Folk Psychological Narratives: The Socio-Cultural Basis Understanding Reasons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Hutto, D. D. (2009) ‘Folk psychology as narrative practice’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16, 9–39.
Hutto, D. D. (forthcoming) ‘Philosophy of mind’s new lease on life: Autopoietic enactivism meets teleosemiotics’. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
Hutto D. D. and E. Myin (forthcoming) Radicalizing Enactivism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)
MacIntyre, A. (1981) After Virtue (London: Duckworth).
McDowell, J. (2007a) ‘What myth?’, Inquiry, 50, 338–51.
McDowell, J. (2007b) ‘Response to Dreyfus’, Inquiry, 50, 366–70.
McDowell, J. (2009). Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Millikan, R. G. (2004) Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press).
Noë, A. (2004) Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Ramsey, W. M. (2007) Representation Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rey, G. (2002) ‘Problems with Dreyfus’ dialectic’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1, 403–8
Searle, J. R. (1983) Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Searle, J. R. (1991a) ‘Response: The background of intentionality and action’, in E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.) John Searle and His Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell), 289–99.
Searle, J. R. (1991b) ‘Response: Explanation in the social sciences’, in E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.) John Searle and His Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell), 335–42.
Searle, J. R. (2010) Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Searle, J. R. (2011) ‘Wittgenstein and the background’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 48(2), 117–26
Shapiro, L. (2011) Embodied Cognition (London: Routledgel.
Stich, S. and I. Ravenscroft (1996) ‘What is Folk Psychology?’ in Deconstructing the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2012 Daniel D. Hutto
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hutto, D.D. (2012). Exposing the Background: Deep and Local. In: Radman, Z. (eds) Knowing without Thinking. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-33025-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-36806-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)