Abstract
In his book Troubled Times Lincoln (1999), pointed to a key reason for Japan’s closed markets:
The amakudari system provides substantial reason to be skeptical of the extent of deregulation and the unilateral market opening in Japan because of the manner in which this practice establishes a broad web of personal ties between government and Japanese firms.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
E. Lincoln, Troubled Times: US-Japan Trade Relations in the 1990s (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), p. 190.
K. Calder, ‘Elites in an Equalizing Role: Ex-Bureaucrats as Coordinators and Intermediaries in the Japanese Government Relationship’, Comparative Politics, 21, 4 (1989): 379–403 (p. 389).
K. Tsutsumi, The Monster Ministries and Amakudari: White Paper on Corruption [Kyodai Shocho Amakudari: Fuhai Hakusho] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2000), pp. 145–75.
S. Carpenter, Why Japan Can’t Reform: Inside the System (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 147.
Copyright information
© 2012 Susan Carpenter
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Carpenter, S. (2012). Amakudari in the Ministries’ IAIs, Public Corporations, Research Institutes and Affiliated Agencies: the Insidious Side. In: Japan’s Nuclear Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230363717_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230363717_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-34673-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-36371-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Business & Management CollectionBusiness and Management (R0)