Thailand: Reform Failures amidst Political Changes

  • Xiaoke Zhang
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


This chapter provides a chronological narrative and analysis of capital market reforms in Thailand since the late 1980s. The central proposition is that the highly fragmented party system interacted with decentralised and incohesive parties to create strong incentives for politicians to pursue private-regarding interests through market reforms for much of the period under question. Equally importantly, these inter-party and intra-party configurations weakened the ability of policy-makers to initiate and implement reform policies decisively and resolutely, even in response to significant external market pressures and economic shocks, particularly the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. In the early and mid-2000s, more decisive and programmatic market reforms were introduced, primarily because of the increasingly concentrated party and political structure dominated by the Thai Rak Thai. However, the ruling TRT, while more centralised and cohesive than most other Thai political parties, was plagued by critical organisational weaknesses. As a result, reform policies continued to suffer from considerable instability and poor credibility. The overall process of capital market reforms was thus less successful in Thailand than in Singapore.


Stock Market Corporate Governance Capital Market Market Reform Security Company 
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Copyright information

© Xiaoke Zhang 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiaoke Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.University of NottinghamUK

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