Abstract
Turkey was one of the first European countries to adopt a system of the judicial review of the constitutionality of laws. The Turkish Constitutional Court was established by the Constitution of 1961, and was conceived as an effective check over the often arbitrary power of parliamentary majorities. Indeed, one of the main weaknesses of the 1924 Constitution was the absence of an effective system of checks and balances. Since then, the Constitutional Court has played a major role in Turkish politics and often pursued an activist approach that put it in collision with the elected branches of government, as will be spelled out below.
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Notes
Dominique Rousseau, Droit du contentieux constitutionnel (Paris: Montchretien, 1990), pp. 91–104.
Ece Göztepe, Anayasa Şikâyeti (Ankara: AÜHF; 1998).
Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 151.
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 50–59.
Ran Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 93–118.
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© 2011 Ergun Özbudun
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Ă–zbudun, E. (2011). Constitutional Justice. In: The Constitutional System of Turkey. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230337855_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230337855_7
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