Abstract
[…*] I HAVE TRIED TO show you the extent to which this practice of veridiction, of [ethical] parrhēsia differed from political parrhēsia in its form, objectives, domain of application, and also in its procedures, even though, of course, this moral parrhēsia, this ethical veridiction puts itself forward and justifies itself, in part at least, by its usefulness for the city and by the fact that it is necessary for the good government and safety of the city. The Apology recounted and justified the foundation of this ethical parrhēsia in and by Socratic practice. What I tried to show you last week is that the Laches gave an example of ethical parrhēsia which is noteworthy for two reasons.
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© 2011 Graham Burchell
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Gros, F., Ewald, F., Fontana, A. (2011). 29 February 1984. In: Gros, F., Ewald, F., Fontana, A. (eds) The Courage of the Truth (The Government of Self and Others II). Michel Foucault. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230309104_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230309104_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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