Abstract
My aim in this chapter is to characterize more precisely the relations between the central state and big business in Russia. The questions addressed are: is the central Russian state a unitary actor in its dealings with business, or is the notion of rival ‘clans’ or networks closer to the mark? Have people in the state apparatus been seeking to place more assets in state ownership in general or to ensure that trusted magnates will control assets in the interests of particular groups of politicians, or is there some mix of these objectives across sectors and across factions?
If the state says we must give up our companies, we will give them up. I do not separate myself from the state. (Oleg Deripaska, main owner of the world’s largest aluminium company)
What difference does it make whether something isstate property or private property? (Igor Sechin, deputy prime minister of Russia)
You might think that getting into bed with the Kremlin was like playing cards with the devil, but Russia’s oligarchs have long ago learnt how to beat the devil at his own game. (Yulia Latynina, writer and commentator.)1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
P. Foot (2006). P.F.EYE. An Idiot’s Guide to the Private Finance Initiative. Private Eye, London. N.d.; later issues of Private Eye, passim.
Quoted in A. Ostrovsky (2008). ‘Enigma Variations. A Special Report on Russia’, Economist, 29 November, p. 10.
J. Kent (2008). ‘The Rise and Fall of IPOC’, The Royal Gazette (Bermuda), 28 May.
V. Belkovskii and V. Golyshev (2006). Biznes Vladimira Putina, Ekaterinburg: Ul’tra.kul’tura.
C. Belton and N. Buckley (2008). ‘On the Offensive: How Gunvor Rose to the Top of Russian Oil Trading’, Financial Times, 14 May. In April 2009 Surgut purchased 21.22 per cent of the Hungarian oil and gas company MOL from the Austrian OMV. This looked very much like a purchase sponsored by someone else, and led among other things to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting that the Russian government supply more information about
Surgut. I. Malkova and O. Petrova (2009). ‘Bogdanov ne poskupilsya’, Vedomosti, 31 March;
I. Maalkova (2009). ‘Bilet na voinu’, Vedomosti, 10 April.
Renaissance Capital (2008). Oil and Gas Yearbook 2008, Moscow: Renaissance Capital, p. 25.
On the reported political-elite terminology, contrasting doverennye businesspeople with kosmopolity (cosmopolitans) or offshornye aristokraty (offshore aristocrats), see P. Hanson (2007). ‘The Turn to Statism in Russian Economic Policy’, The International Spectator, 42, no. 1 (March), 29–42, pp. 34–5.
E. Mazneva (2009). ‘Dobavi $2 mlrd’, Uedomosti, 3 April. The reports implied that the sale was feasible, despite the purchase not having been completed. Reuters report of 10 July 2008 (by Yelena Fabrichnaya) for the delay in the FAS decision. Uedomosti 19 December 2008 (report by Yelena Mazneva) for subsequent state actions.
Irina Reznik (2007). Uedomosti, 30 July. Seleznev evidently believed, along with the press commentators, that Rosneft was the main contender for control of Russneft.
See Y. Pis’mennaya (2008). Uedomosti, 14 and 17 July; and D. Kaz’min (2008). 18 July.
O. Pleshanova, Y. Kisileva and D. Butrin (2008). ‘Regardless of Legal Entities, Dmitry Medvedev Advised to Abolish the State Corporations’, Kommersant, as reported by BBC Monitoring.
G. Stack (2007). ‘ZAO Kremlin: The Chemezov Code’, Russia Profile, 5 September.
P. Finn (2006). Washington Post, 19 November, pp. A1, A13.
A. Dagayeva (2008). Uedomosti, 22 October;
M. Antoniva (2008). Moscow News, 22 October.
A. Dagayeva (2008). Uedomosti, 14 November. The overflight fees are in breach of international agreements about overflying national territories. Russia is supposed to be reducing them and in 2013 finally eliminating them as one of the conditions of its agreement with the EU on accession to the World Trade Organization. In any case, there is no good reason for such fees to be paid to just one out of a number of Russian airlines.
A. E. Kremer (2008). ‘Behind Challenge to Aeroflot, Political Rivalry’, International Herald Tribune, 28 November, p. 16; ‘Russia’s New State Airline Will Stifle Competition’, Airwise, 11 November 2008 (http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1226396700.html; accessed 30 January 2008).
The account of the merger proposal that follows is based on the following reports and commentaries: Y. Fedorinova (2009): Y. Fedorinova (2009). ‘Ob’edininit’ vse’, Vedomosti, 19 January; Y. Fedorinova, ‘Noviy BHP’, Vedomosti, 21 January 2009;
Y. Latynina (2009). ‘The Oligarchs’ Kondratyev Crisis’, Moscow Times, 28 January;
I. Titova (2009). ‘V Kremle vystupayut protiv sozdaniya “rossiiskogo BHP Billiton”’, RB.ru, 20 January.
Y. Latynina (2009). ‘The Oligarchs’ Kondratyev Crisis’, Moscow Times, 28 January, p. 8.
Y. Fedorinova (2009). Vedomosti, 10 February.
A. Denisova (2009). Vedomosti, 12 January.
A. Terent’eva et al. (2009). Vedomosti, 29 January.
A. Denisova (2009). Vedomosti, 10 February.
For example, V. Ukhov (2009). ‘Duumvirat raskalyvaetsya?’ New Times, no. 1–2 (19 January), pp. 5–8.
Reported by Y. Pis’mennaya et al. (2009). Vedomosti, 12 January. That report cites an aide to Medvedev as saying that the criticism had been agreed with the Prime Minister. Medvedev has inherited Putin’s presidential role of criticizing the government in public; the difference from Putin’s time is that on such occasions the Prime Minister now is not present on these occasions (Aleksandr Minkin in Moskovskii komsomolets, 23 January 2009).
Y. Pis’mennaya (2008). Vedomosti, 29 December.
Y. Pis’mennaya et al. (2009). Vedomosti, 12 January.
A. Nikol’skii (2009). Vedomosti, 16 January.
Y. Pis’mennaya (2009). Vedomosti, 19 January.
O. Kuvshinova et al. (2009). Vedomosti, 30 January.
Igor Yurgens, director of the Medvedev-linked Institute of Contemporary Development, describes the origin of the Yukos affair as follows: Those who planned it worked on Putin’s sensitivities, saying, ‘You’ve been deceived…’ ‘Est’ li zhizn’ v ‘verkhnykh sloyakh atmosfery’?’ interview with I. Yurgens by O. Shorina (2009). New Ti Vedomosti, 10 February 2009.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2011 Philip Hanson
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hanson, P. (2011). Networks, Cronies and Business Plans: Business–State Relations in Russia. In: Kononenko, V., Moshes, A. (eds) Russia as a Network State. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306707_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306707_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-32083-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-30670-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)