Abstract
In Chapter 6 of A Treatise on Probability (1973 [1921], hereafter TP), John Maynard Keynes raised a question he described as “somewhat novel.” This concerned the problem he labeled “The weight of arguments.”
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© 2011 Isaac Levi
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Levi, I. (2011). The Weight of Argument. In: Brandolini, S.M.D., Scazzieri, R. (eds) Fundamental Uncertainty. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305687_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305687_3
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