Abstract
Arguments that turn on questions of luck have been a staple of the free will literature for a very long time. Typically, these arguments have been aimed at libertarianism. The traditional luck objection against libertarianism turns on the claim that an undetermined event is merely a lucky event, and lucky events cannot enhance our freedom. At best, such events add nothing to freedom; on this view, libertarianism has no advantage over compatibilism. At worst, such lucky events would detract from our freedom; on this view, compatibilism has an advantage over libertarianism. Despite the centrality of arguments from luck to the free will debate, however, for the most part philosophers working on free will have been content to use an intuitive and rough conception of luck. In this paper, I shall defend a more precise conception; with this account of luck in hand, I shall argue that luck is a more serious problem than has formerly been recognized. It is not uniquely a problem for libertarianism, but for all accounts of free will.
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© 2011 Neil Levy
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Levy, N. (2011). Luck and Free Will. In: Aguilar, J.H., Buckareff, A.A., Frankish, K. (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Action. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230304253_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230304253_9
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