Abstract
A billionaire tells you: “That chair is in my way; I don’t feel like moving it myself, but if you push it out of my way I’ll give you $100.” You decide you don’t want the billionaire’s money and you’d rather have him go through the trouble of moving the chair himself, so you graciously turn down the offer and go home. As it turns out, the billionaire is also a stingy old miser; he was never willing to let go of $100. Knowing full well that the chair couldn’t be moved due to the fact that it was glued to the ground, he simply wanted to have a laugh at your expense.
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© 2011 Carolina Sartorio
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Sartorio, C. (2011). Failing to Do the Impossible. In: Aguilar, J.H., Buckareff, A.A., Frankish, K. (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Action. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230304253_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230304253_3
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