The Normative Context of Well-Being

Abstract

In Part I, I argued that the normative basis of cultural belonging — membership in a culture — encounters difficulties when it comes to justifying the claims of culture from a liberal standpoint. It has a propensity to reify culture and to place minority ‘cultures’ within a moral hierarchy. And, I proposed a model of culture within the paradigm of anti-essentialism. However, the question remains: What should be the normative basis of intercultural justice and freedom within the paradigm of an anti-essentialist notion of culture? In this chapter I shall develop a normative account on the basis of the circumstances of justice within the multicultural paradigm of the anti-essentialist notion of culture. My point of departure is the liberal assumption of Kymlicka that is endorsed by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin in their doctrines of liberalism. The liberal camp attaches importance to individuals leading a good life according to their beliefs, on the assumption that these beliefs are fallible and revisable (Kymlicka 1995: 109; also Kymlicka 1989: Chapter 9; cf. Rawls 1999; Dworkin 1981). Therefore, for liberals, it is of fundamental importance that individuals be able to rationally assess their convictions ‘in the light of new information or experiences, and to revise them if they are not worthy of our continued allegiance’ (Kymlicka 1995: 81). That is, liberals assume individuals are ‘capable of revising and changing’ their conceptions of the good life as ‘they can stand back from their current ends to “survey and assess” their worthiness’ (Kymlicka 1995: 81; cf. Rawls 1980: 544; cf. Mill 1982: 122; cf. Dworkin 1983). However, as I discussed in Chapter 1, in attaching importance to this assumption and placing normative weight on cultural membership, Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism has a problematic tendency to fall into the trap of essentializing culture.