Rejectionism about Truth

  • Matti Eklund
Part of the New Waves in Philosophy book series (NWIP)

Abstract

It often happens, for various reasons, that philosophers defend radical views which, first, are too radical to be plausible, and, second, are such that a less radical and more plausible view would satisfy the underlying motivations. Here is a historical example. The logical positivists famously sought to eliminate traditional metaphysics by arguing that the statements metaphysicians make are meaningless because of being unverifiable. Much of the ensuing discussion concerned whether verifiability is really necessary for meaningfulness. But clearly, even if the logical positivists were wrong about this, they could still have a strong case for the elimination of metaphysics. For already if they could establish that the statements made by metaphysicians are unverifiable, they could argue for the pointlessness of the enterprise. If we cannot obtain good evidence for or against the statements of metaphysics, surely metaphysics is a pointless enterprise.

Keywords

Explanatory Role Folk Psychology Truth Predicate Correspondence Theory Peano Arithmetic 
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Copyright information

© Matti Eklund 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matti Eklund

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