A New Problem for the Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth

  • Gillian Russell
Part of the New Waves in Philosophy book series (NWIP)


My target in this chapter is a view that has sometimes been called the ‘Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth’ (L-DoNT) and sometimes ‘Conventionalism about Necessity’.1 It is the view that necessity is grounded in the meanings of our expressions—meanings which are sometimes identified with the conventions governing those expressions—and that our knowledge of that necessity is based on our knowledge of those meanings or conventions. In its simplest form the view states that a truth, if it is necessary, is necessary (and knowably necessary) because it is analytic.


Natural Kind Contingent Proposition Logical Truth True Proposition Modal Phenomenon 
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© Gillian Russell 2010

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  • Gillian Russell

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