Abstract
Truth is presumably worth caring about: the goal of believing what is true and not what is false is a goal worth having. But what makes it worth having? Philosophers often say that part of what makes truth worth caring about is its instrumental value, though they debate whether truth has additional, non-instrumental value as well. In my view, the consensus that truth is instrumentally valuable is mistaken. Truth is not instrumentally valuable, at least not in the way philosophers standardly assume.
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© 2010 Chase B. Wrenn
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Wrenn, C.B. (2010). True Belief Is Not Instrumentally Valuable. In: Wright, C.D., Pedersen, N.J.L.L. (eds) New Waves in Truth. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230296992_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230296992_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-22998-3
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-29699-2
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)