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Perestroika as Revolution from Above

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Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin

Part of the book series: St Antony’s Series ((STANTS))

Abstract

Perestroika is an ambiguous concept. The term was chosen by Mikhail Gorbachev partly because the word ‘reform’ had been taboo in Soviet ruling circles ever since the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968, the unfolding of which also put paid to Aleksei Kosygin’s modest attempt to reform the Soviet economy. Gorbachev had used the word perestroika in speeches and writings on a number of occasions even before he became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985. What he meant by it, however, changed over time, especially during the period of less than seven years in which he was Soviet leader. In 1985 he believed that the Soviet system was reformable and ‘perestroika’ was for him essentially a synonym for reform. The imprecision of the word had the initial advantage that almost everyone could be in favour of perestroika because they meant so many different things by it. In retrospect, conservative Communists felt they had been hoodwinked. Given their political outlook, they should have opposed the reforms of the perestroika era more vigorously and earlier than they did. They were kept on board not only by the hierarchical nature of Soviet politics and the power and authority which accrued to the general secretaryship. What also wrongfooted them was Gorbachev’s success in establishing the dividing line in Soviet politics as lying between a pro-perestroika progressive majority and a reactionary anti-perestroika minority.

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Notes

  1. Viktor Kuvaldin (2005), ‘Three forks in the road of Gorbachev’s Perestroika’, in Andrei Grachev, Chiara Blengino and Rossella Stievano (eds), 1985–2005: Twenty Years that Changed the World (Turin: World Political Forum and Editori Laterza), pp.337–51, at p.343.

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  2. Mikhail Gorbachev (2006), Poniat’ perestroiku … pochemu eto vazhno seichas (Moscow: Al’pina), p. 16.

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  3. Among all his Western interlocutors, those whom Gorbachev felt closest to politically were Felipe González, the Spanish prime minister, and the president of the Socialist International and former German Chancellor, Willy Brandt. See Andrei Grachev (1994), Kremlevskaia khronika (Moscow: EKSMO), p.247; See also Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘Delaet li chelovek politiku? Delaet li chelovek istoriiu?’, Svobodnaia mysl’, No. 17, 1992, pp.17–21. In this article, following Brandt’s death, Gorbachev pays warm tribute to him, emphasizing the closeness of their ideas and their personal friendship. The same issue of the journal contains a transcript of the conversation between Brandt and Gorbachev of 17 October 1989.

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  4. The dissident groups were too miniscule and too persecuted to come into the category of civil society. The nearest approximation to activity which could be deemed a manifestation of civil society was environmentalist campaigning, especially the efforts in the post-Stalin era to save Lake Baikal and the opposition to the Brezhnev-era grandiose scheme to divert Siberian rivers for the benefit of Kazakhstan and Soviet Central Asia. See Douglas R. Weiner (1999), A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press).

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  5. Isaiah Berlin (1957), The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (New York: Mentor).

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  6. Yegor Gaidar has produced an account of the policies of perestroika that is as economically determinist as the Marxism he earlier jettisoned. He is particularly unconvincing in attributing virtually every major policy of Gorbachev to a concern that the Soviet Union was going financially bankrupt. Gaidar provides, however, much valuable information on the growing economic crisis after 1988, exacerbated as it was by the sharp fall in the price of oil during the second half of the 1980s. See Yegor Gaidar (2007), Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution).

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  9. See Archie Brown (2009), The Rise and Fall of Communism (London: Bodley Head), pp.593–8.

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  10. See, for example, Rigby’s introduction to T.H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw (eds) (1983), Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia (London: Allen & Unwin);

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  14. See Andrei Grachev (2008), Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Cambridge: Polity), pp.166–8; and Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, pp.522–8.

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  15. Jack F. Matlock, Jr (1995), Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House), p.122.

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  16. Nikolai Ryzhkov (1992), Perestroika: Istoriia predatel’stv (Moscow: Novosti), p.291.

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© 2010 Archie Brown

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Brown, A. (2010). Perestroika as Revolution from Above. In: Fortescue, S. (eds) Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230293144_6

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