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Part of the book series: The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series ((PMAES))

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Abstract

In the previous two chapters we saw that the rise of utilitarianism led to an increased concern for animals amongst political theorists. While writers such as Hutcheson, Primatt and Bentham all made the link between sentience and justice, the first comprehensive utilitarian theory of animal justice did not arrive until the publication of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation in the 1970s. However, we also saw how one group of critics regarded utilitarianism to be flawed as a basis to protect animals. These critics argued that utilitarianism was flawed because of its focus on aggregate utility and its failure to offer any absolute prohibitions on the treatment of individual animals. Critics like Tom Regan claimed that we need a theory which recognises the inherent value and rights of individual animals.

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Notes

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© 2010 Alasdair Cochrane

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Cochrane, A. (2010). Liberalism and Animals. In: An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230290594_4

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