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Transition and the ‘Speciation’ of the Japanese Model

  • Ugo Pagano
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Abstract

The Japanese model came about in a country that was at that time an isolated periphery of the capitalist system. In many respects, it was an unintended consequence of the policies followed during the American occupation of the country when the zaibatsu companies were at first nationalized and then privatized. The emergence of the Japanese species of capitalism implies that the transformations occurring in the former socialist countries cannot be seen as a transition from a unique model of socialism to a unique model of capitalism. The paper claims that capitalism is characterized by multiple ‘organizational equilibria’ characterized by different interactions between technologies and property rights. It is argued that the ‘allopatric’ form of speciation, that characterized the emergence of the Japanese model, should not be regarded as an uninteresting exception. It can be very relevant to the understanding of the processes occurring in the former socialist economies where different initial conditions and different institutional shocks can also lead to the emergence of new ‘organizational equilibria’.

Keywords

Corporate Governance European Economy Agency Cost Socialist Country Capitalist Ownership 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000

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  • Ugo Pagano

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