Abstract
The concept of ‘morale’ is vague. In a recent study Gary Sheffield called it ‘an imprecise term’,1 echoing J. G. Fuller’s 1990 evaluation that it is ‘an elusive subject’.2 Earlier commentators also struggled to define it. Even the influential military theorist, Clausewitz, whose writings were valued by European military commanders, including the British, was deliberately vague on the matter:
We prefer, therefore, to remain here more than usually incomplete and rhapsodical [on the subject of morale], content to have drawn attention to the importance of the subject in a general way.3
Yet this vague term assumed an enormous importance in British military thought and during much of the war it formed an essential element of strategic planning. Napoleon and Clausewitz remained the most influential writers for those who tried to define morale. Pre-war military theorists believed that human nature and, more importantly, human character shaped the fighting qualities of their troops. Likewise, other armies relied on similar qualities among their own troops. Undermining the enemy’s morale was as important as sustaining one’s own.
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Notes
G. Sheffield, ‘Officer-Man Relations: Morale and Discipline in the British Army 1902–1922’, PhD thesis, King’s College, London, 1994’, p. 63.
J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914–1918 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), p. 21.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anotol Rapaport (Penguin, London, 1982), p. 252.
Cited in T. H. E. Travers, The Killing Ground The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918 (Routledge, London, 1990), p. 20.
Travers, The Killing Ground, p. 17 and pp. 127–46.
The case of 35th Division; see extended discussion in Chapter 4. See also, G. Oram, ‘“A serious example is necessary”: the Death Penalty and the British Army 1900–1918’, forthcoming article.
A most extreme case of this occurred in December 1916 when the commander of 8th Division and his staff officer were sacked in response to concerns of poor discipline.
More than 6500 Belgian and French civilians were executed by German firing squads in the first months of the war. In most cases this appears to have been a case of an over-reaction by the army units concerned: a ‘great fear’ of a franctireur-type resistance had taken hold in the invading forces. John Home, ‘German War-Crimes in Belgium and France, August-October 1914’, conference paper given at the Unquiet Graves Conference at Ieper, Belgium on 20 May 2000.
Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (Penguin, London, 1992), pp. 164–5.
Jay M. Winter, ‘Propaganda and the Mobilization of Consent’, in Hew Strachan (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), p. 216.
Brigadier General F. P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (Cedric Chivers, Bath, 1930), p. 42.
Winter, ‘Propaganda and Mobilization of Consent’, pp. 219–20.
Leiutenant-Colonel S. V. Riddell, Memorandum on Field Punishments, 9 November 1915 (p. 2) in Maxse Papers, IWM, 69/53/6, File 14/1.
Instructions for the training of Platoons for Offensive Action Part III, ss (d), 2000 reprint (The Military Press, Milton Keynes, 2000), p. 99.
Brigadier General John Charteris, At G. H. Q. (Cassell, London, 1931), p. 214. Charteris was another British general who was fond of quoting Napoleon; see pp. 237 and 274.
It appears that Charteris and Lieutenant-General Sir George MacDonogh, Director of Military Intelligence, did not agree about the state of German morale during 1916–17. See Travers, The Killing Ground, pp. 115–18.
Winston S. Churchill, The Boer War: London to Ladysmith via Pretoria and Ian Hamilton’s March (Leo Cooper, London, 1989), p. 110.
Gary Sheffield, ’ “A very good type of Londoner and a very good type of colonial”’: Officer-Man Relations and Discipline in the 22nd Royal Fusiliers, 1914–18’, in Brian Bond et al, ‘Look to Your Front’: Studies in the First World War (Spellmount, Staplehurst, 1999), p. 145.
Nick Bosanquet, ‘Health Systems in Khaki: The British and American Medical Experience’ in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds), Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (Leo Cooper, London, 1997), p. 457.
See for example the execution of three men of the Durham Light Infantry whose unit ‘has not done well in the fighting line’, PRO W071/534.
The Fifth Glo’ster Gazette. Almost every edition featured a list of awards and promotions.
Jeffrey, K. (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918–1922 (Bodley Head, London, 1985), p. 42.
Babington, For the Sake ofExample, pp. 88–9. Putkowski and Sykes, Shot at Dawn, pp. 126–7.
Private John Braithwaite, an Australian serving with the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, was executed on 29 October 1916. PRO W0790/6.
Note on the Morale of British troops in France as disclosed by the censorship. PRO CAB24/26.
Papers of Captain Hardie. IWM 84/64/1. Report on morale, dated 25 August 1917, p. 1.
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© 2003 Gerard Christopher Oram
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Oram, G. (2003). Military Theory and Redefining Troop Morale. In: Military Executions during World War I. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287983_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287983_4
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